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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOANN L. BAILEY, a widow and 
TODD F. BAILEY minor son of 
FRANK DEE BAILEY, deceased, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION and UTAH 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
Case No. 
10148 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The Plaintiffs have appealed from the Order of 
the Industrial Commission of Utah denying the 
Plaintiffs' application for benefits under the Work-
men's Compensation Act of the State of Utah. The 
Order of the Commission found that the deceased 
doing business as Frank's American Oil Station was 
insured by a policy issued by the State Insurance 
Fund as a self-employed individual within the mean-
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ing of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State 
of Utah. The Order of the Commission did deny 
that the deceased was in the course of his employ-
ment at the time the fatal accident occurred. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION 
The Industrial Commission held that deceased 
was on his way to work at the time the fatal acci-
dent occurred and was not acting within the course 
of his employment as a self-insured owner and oper-
ator of his business. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants submit that the decision of the 
Industrial Commission should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Frank Dee Bailey, the deceased, was the owner 
and operator of a service station named Frank's 
American Oil Station, which was situated on State 
Street in Lehi, Utah, State Street being U. S. High-
way 91 (R-15). He resided at 660 North 3rd West, 
American Fork, Utah (R-23 and 45). Mr. Bailey al-
ways opened the station. He left his home ordinarily 
between 5:00 and 5:30a.m. and went directly to the 
station (R-16). His usual hours at the station were 
from 6 :00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Being the proprietor 
he apparently went back and forth as occasion de-
manded. (R-19). 
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A fatal accident occurred involving Frank Dee 
Bailey on September 23, 1963, some seven-tenths 
of a mile south of Frank's American Oil Station. 
The accident occurred at 5:45 a.m. on U. S. High-
way 91, as the deceased was traveling from his home 
in American Fork towards his service station lo-
cated in Lehi, at which time deceased, driving a 1959 
Pontiac station wagon, hit the first concrete pillar 
on the overhead bridge on Interstate 15, which was 
then under construction ( R-45-46) . The record is 
clPar that he was not on any special mission, but 
was, at the time, going to work. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ONE TRAVELING TO AND FROM HIS 
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT IS NOT COVERED 
UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
ACT IN THE ABSENCE OF A SPECIAL MIS-
SION FOR HIS EMPLOYER. 
The service station operated by the deceased, 
Frank Dee Bailey, was situated in the town of Lehi, 
Utah, whereas his residence was at 660 North 3rd 
\rest, American Fork, Utah. The evidence is clear 
that the deceased, at the time he met with his fatal 
accident, was on his way from his home in American 
Fork, Utah to his station in Lehi, Utah. The Plain-
tiffs, herein, at the time of the hearing, made no 
effort to show that the deceased was on some special 
mission on behalf of his business. It appears clear 
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that he was on a direct route from his home to his 
place of business at the time of the accident. The 
accident occurred on U. S. Highway 91, between 
American Fork and Lehi, Utah (R 45). 
It has consistently been held by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah, that as a general rule 
employment does not begin until the employee has 
reached the premises where the work is to be done; 
that normally coming and going to work is not with-
in the course of employment in the absence of a 
special mission. 
This rule has been held by our Supreme Court 
to apply to an automobile salesman who was driving 
home in his own car after a day's work when he was 
injured in an accident. The Court held that the acci-
dent did not occur in the course of the salesman's 
employment. Covey-Ballard Motor Company vs. In-
dustrial Commission, 64 Utah 1, 227 P. 1028. 
In Wilson vs. Industrial Commission, 116 Utah 
46, 207 P. 2d. 1116, it was held that the injuries 
sustained by an automobile shop foreman as a re-
sult of an automobile accident while enroute to his 
regular place of employment in Magna, did not arise 
out of or in the course of his employment merely 
because on the evening prior to the accident the 
employer had instructed the foreman to complete 
repairs on an automobile and take it to Salt Lake 
City, since the employer's instructions did not send 
the foreman upon a special errand, but merely out-
lined what would be expected of him in performing 
his duties the next day. 
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At page 207 P. 2d. 1118 the Court said: 
Even though decedent was foreman at 
any one or all of Wilson's shops, unless the 
contract of employment contemplated the em-
ployer-employee relationship would commence 
when deceased left his home, it would be nec-
essary for the status to be created by some 
special mission enroute to work before de-
ceased would be within the protection of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. In view of the 
fact that during all of the time decedent had 
been on Wilson's regular pay roll as foreman, 
his work had been at the Magna shop, unless 
the trip on the morning of the accident was 
different from that on previous mornings and 
in the nature of a special mission, deceased's 
employment commenced at the time he arrived 
at that shop and not at the time he left his 
home in Salt Lake City. It, therefore, follows 
that if the instructions Wilson gave the dece-
dent on the evening preceding the day of the 
accident merely outlined the duties deceased 
was expected to perform after he arrived at 
the Magna shop, then the employer-employee 
relationship would not come into existence 
until the deceased's arrival at the latter place. 
In Vitagraph, Inc. vs. Industrial Commission, 
85 P. 2d. 601, 96 Utah 190, at 603 P. 2d., the Court 
said: 
It seems definitely settled that if a work-
man is injured in the normal course of things, 
in going to or from his work or place of em-
ployment, that is the result of general hazards 
which all must meet and assume and is not 
in the course of his employment. Denver & 
Rio Grande Western R. Co. vs. Industrial 
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Commission, 72 U. 199, 269 P. 512, 62 ALR 
1436; Fidelity & Casualty Co. vs. Industrial 
Commission, 79 U. 189, 8 P. 2d. 617; Greer 
vs. Industrial Commission, 7 4 U. 379, 279 P. 
900. Such is what may be called the plant rule 
where the employee does not attach himself 
to his employment until he arrives at the 
plant or locus of his work, and he is not in 
the employment after he leaves the plant or 
situs of his work. 
The nature of the hazard involved in the case 
now being considered in the deceased traveling to 
and from his place of employment is one which is 
common to all persons using the highway. Such risk 
is not one that is peculiar to the employment of the 
deceased. 
Plaintiffs raise the point that the deceased had 
with him some articles used in his business. This 
Court has considered this problem in the past. 
In Fidelity & Casualty Co. vs. Industrial Com-
mission, 8 P. 2d. 617, 79 U. 189, the Court had before 
it a case in which, at the time of his death, Edwin 
J. Shufelt was employed by Walgreen Company and 
among the things that he was required to do was 
ride a bicycle to make deliveries of Kodak films. His 
duties required him to call each morning, except 
Sunday, at the Semloh Hotel and pick up film to take 
to the plant of his employer. On the morning of his 
death he left his home riding the bicycle. The acci-
dent occurred about 3 miles from the Semloh Hotel 
and about 1% blocks frmn where he resided. He had 
with him a bag furnished by Walgreen Company for 
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the purpose of carrying the film. The Court said at 
619 P. 2cl.: 
Under the facts in this case we are un-
able to perceive of any reason why the general 
rule, that an employee on his way to work 
is not within the protection of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act, does not apply. The mere 
fact that Edwin was required to remain at 
the Semloh Hotel only long enough to pick 
up films does not justify the conclusion that 
he was under the protection of the act when 
he was about three miles from the hotel on 
his way to work. 
In considering the whole problem the Court had 
this to say at 618 P. 2d.: 
The troublesome question presented by 
this record is: Did the injuries which caused 
the death of Edwin J. Shufelt arise out of or 
in the course of his employment? It is a gen-
eral rule of law that an injury sustained by 
an employee while going to or returning from 
his place of work upon his own initiative in 
a conveyance of his own choosing and on his 
own time is not an injury arising out of or 
in the course of his employment and hence an 
injury thus sustained is not compensable un-
der Workmen's Compensation Acts. This 
court is committed to such doctrine. North 
Point Consol. Irr. Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 61 U. 421, 214 P. 22; Greer v. Industrial 
Commission, 7 4 U. 379, 279 P. 900; Denver 
& Rio Grande W. R. Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 72 U. 199, 269 P. 512, 62 ALR 1436; 
Covey-Ballard Motor Co. vs. Industrial Com-
mission, 64 U. 11,227 P. 1028. There are some 
exceptions to the general rule. One of such 
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exception is where an injury results because 
of a danger or peril incident to the use of a 
particular method or means of approach to 
the place of work. Cudahy Packing Co. v. In-
dustrial Commission, 60 U. 161, 207 P. 148 
28 ALR 1394; Bountiful Brick Co. v. Indus~ 
trial Commission, 68 U. 600, 251 P. 555. It 
is clear that this case does not fall within that 
exception. Another exception to the general 
rule is where an employee while going to or 
from work on his own time or that of his em-
ployer is engaged, when injured, in some sub-
stantial mission for his employer growing out 
of his employment. Kahn Bros Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission, 75 U. 145, 283 P. 1054. 
In the case of Greer v. State Industrial Com-
mission of Utah, 74 Utah 379, 279 P. 900, a carpen-
ter foreman was injured shortly before 8 :00 a.m. as 
he was on his way to work, when he was struck by 
an automobile as he was crossing over from the 
crosswalk to enter an automobile driven by a fellow 
workman. At the time of his injury he was carrying 
a saw which he had taken home the night before to 
sharpen as one of his duties required him to keep 
the saws sharpened. The Commission denied com-
pensation, and in affirming the order the Court said 
at page 279 P. 901: 
Under the facts in the instant case, it is 
clear that the deceased was not upon any spe-
cial mission for his employer at the time of 
the accident. There was nothing that he was 
doing for his master at the time which exposed 
him to the perils of the street. He was merely 
going from his home to his place of employ-
ment. The fact that he was carrying the saw 
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was 1nerely incidental. The employee did not 
come within any of the exceptions to the gen-
eral rule. 
The Court in the Greer case went on to say: 
In this case the deceased was not injured 
while sha;rpening the saw at his home. The 
accident did not occur while he was actually 
engaged in the performance of a duty for 
the employer. The dangers of the street be-
tween his home and the stockyards were not 
incident to his employment, but were dangers 
common to all. (emphasis ours) 
Under the facts in the instant case it is clear 
that the deceased was not upon any special mission 
for his employer or in connection with his employ-
ment at the time of the accident. There was nothing 
he was doing in connection with the operation of 
the service station at the time which exposed him to 
the perils of the street. He was merely going from 
his home to his place of employment. The accident 
did not occur while he was actually engaged in the 
performance of a duty related to the operation of 
the service station. The dangers of the street between 
his home and the service station were not incident 
to his employment, but were dangers common to all 
as the Court said in the Greer case and the fact that 
he was carrying the saw was incidental. 
It was incidental in the case now before the 
Court that the deceased was wearing his service sta-
tion attendant's uniform, that he had a brief case in 
the vehicle he was driving, that he carried the keys 
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to the station and that the automobile was, on occa-
sion used in the service station business. 
The author of Workmen's Compensation Law 
(Larson) has this to say at Page 251: 
The mere fact that the claimant is, while 
going to work, also carrying with him some 
of the paraphernalia of his employment does 
not, in itself, connect the trip into part of the 
employment. For example, a teacher, after 
setting out on her way to school, remembered 
that she needed a kettle to be used in a school 
pageant. She went back, got the kettle and 
fell while she was on the steps of her home. 
Citing Industrial Commission vs. Harshrader, 
52 Ohio APP. 76, 3 N.E. 2d 61, the Court held in 
that case that even though the claimant was carry-
ing some equipment which might be used at her place 
of employment, this did not bring her within the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Counsel for the Plaintiffs (PB 3) states that in 
the past the Commission has seen fit to award com-
pensation to those who were employees in the strict 
sense for injuries occurring off the actual plant 
premises of the employer. 
The following cases which are cited therein we 
feel should be discussed briefly: 
Bountiful Brick Company vs. Industrial Com-
mission, 68 U. 600, 251 P. 555: 
In this case the deceased employee was killed 
while crossing a railroad track when he was within 
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thirty feet of an opening in the employer's fence. 
This· entrance to the employer's place of business 
was stated by the Court to amount to an invitation 
to the employees to use the entrance in order to enter 
the place where they worked. The Court in this case 
followed the holding in Cudahy Packing Co. vs. In-
dwdrial Commission, 60 U. 160,207 P. 148, in which 
case an Pmployee was struck and killed while neces-
~arily c1·ossing a railroad track on his way to work, 
and just before he reached his employer's premises. 
The Court held that the Bountiful Brick case was 
within the principle decided in the Cudahy Packing 
Co. case. The injury in both cases resulted because 
of a danger or peril incident to the approach or en-
trance to the place of work. 
Kahn Bros. vs. Industrial Commission, 75 U. 
145, 283 P. 1054 is also cited by Plaintiff's counsel. 
In this case the Applicant was struck by an auto-
mobile as he was walking northerly across Fifth 
South Street on the east side of Main Street. The 
Industrial Commission gave an award to the Appli-
cant and the Supreme Court sustained the a ward 
and stated that they were of the opinion that the 
Applicant was on his way to the post office in the 
performance of a special mission for his employer 
at the time that he was injured. The Court stated 
the rule as follows at 283 P. 1054: 
It is a general rule that injuries sustained 
while an employee is traveling to and from 
his place of employment are not compensable . 
. An exception to this rule, however, is where 
an employee, either on his employer's or on 
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his own time, is upon some substantial mis-
sion for the employer growing out of his em-
ployment. In such cases the employee is with-
in the provision of the Act. The mission for 
the employer must be the major factor in the 
journey or movement and not merely inci-
dental thereto. 
The Kahn case then clearly is a case where the 
employee was on some special mission for his em-
ployer. Such is not the case in the instant case now 
before this Court, as there is no indication in the 
evidence that there was any special mission being 
performea at the time of the accident. 
New York Casualty Company vs. Wetherell, 
193 F. 2d. 881, Fifth Circuit, is also cited by Plain-
tiffs. 
In that case Wetherell was employed on con-
tinuous duty at the Schill Plant from Saturday noon 
until 7:30 a.m. Monday morning. In accordance with 
the terms of his con tract he was allowed to go home 
each Sunday to eat a hot breakfast and to pick up 
his lunch. On September 11, 1949 he was struck by 
a railroad train and killed. 
The claim was held to be compensable but that 
case is easily distinguished from the instant case. 
At 193 F. 2d. 881 at Page 882 the Court cited the 
Texas statute, which is broader than the Utah stat-
ute, as follows: 
Injuries sustained in the course of em-
ployment * * * shall include all other injuries 
of every kind and character having to do with 
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and originating in the work, business, trade 
or profession of the employer received by an 
employee while engaged in or about the fur-
therance of the affairs or the business of his 
employer whether upon the employer's prem-
ises or elsewhere. 
The Court stated the general rule as follows: 
It is the general rule, established by the 
~reat weight of authority, that where an in-
JUry occurs at a time not within a contrac-
tual exception, employees may not recover 
compensation for injuries received while go-
ing to and from the place where they are to 
perform labor for the employer. 
The Court reasoned that: 
***the danger Wetherell encountered 
was peculiar to the long period of uninter-
rupted duty and the necessity of going home 
to secure nourishment. 
Such danger was incidental to his long period 
of employment, and the trip home was within his 
contract of hire. 
In Kobe vs. Industrial Accident Commiss'ion, 
35 Cal. 2d. 33, 215 P. 2d. 736, certain employees 
\vere employed to repair the roof of a county court-
house. The terms of their agreement provided that 
they would work nine hours a day and should rflceive 
ten hours pay. The extra hour being paid for travel 
time. While they were returning from work in an 
automobile driven by one of the men, the car was 
struck by a locomotive, all of the men being injured, 
one fatally. The Court in this case recognized the 
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general rule that the injuries sustained by an emh 
ployee going to or coming from work are not conl-
pensable, but pointed out that an employer may 
agree, either expressly or impliedly, that the relation-
ship of employer and employee shall continue during 
the period of coming and going from work. 
The facts in the case now before this Court 
are entirely different from the facts in the Wetherell 
and the Kobe cases. The deceased was not acting 
under any kind of special contractual arrangement 
with an employer, but he was merely going from 
his home to his place of employment at the time the 
accident occurred. 
Plaintiffs rely most heavily upon Morgan vs. 
Industrial Commission, 92 U. 129, 66 P. 2d. 144. 
We submit that this case is not helpful to the Plain-
tiffs inasmuch as the Plaintiff in the Morgan case 
was found by the Supreme Court to be on a special 
mission for his employer at the time the accident 
occurred. The Court said in the majority opinion at 
66 P. 2d. 145: 
After reaching the building he could not 
proceed further with his task because the 
office key had been left home. If he had not 
left the key at home he would have completed 
his work before returning home for lunch. 
His return home was for the purpose of get-
ting the key, not the purpose of eating lunch 
or entertaining visitors. After reaching home, 
however, his errand on behalf of the purpose 
for which he left the school building was in-
terrupted. The continuity of the trip was 
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broken by the eating of lunch, entertaining of 
visitors, and doing the other things men-
tioned. He resumed his errand, however, when 
he finally left home with all the keys in his 
possession intending to go to the schoolhouse 
and finish the work that night. Under the 
holding of this Court in the case of Sullivan 
v. Industrial Commission, 79 U. 317, 10 P. 2d. 
924, Plaintiff would not have been in the 
master's business in doing any of the personal 
things at his home but would again attach 
himself to the master's mission or errand 
when he left home to travel toward the school. 
This, of course, on the assumption that the 
errand home was a substantial one for and 
in the interest of the employer. The fact that 
there was a break in the continuity of the 
errand does not change its purpose if, after 
Plaintiff stepped aside to do personal acts, he 
again resumed the errand. There is an entire 
absence of anything in the evidence from 
which it could be inferred that Plaintiff made 
the trip from the school to his home or again 
from hw home to the school, for any personal 
reason or purpose. (emphasis ours) 
And again at 66 P. 2d. 145 at Page 146: 
We conclude therefore that Plaintiff was 
on an errand in the business of the master 
when he left the school building for the pur-
pose of procuring his key which he had pre-
viously left home, and on his return from 
home to the school building. The fact that the 
journey was interrupted does not change the 
purpose of the errand. (emphasis ours) 
Deceased in this case now before the Court 
was on his ·way to work and was not on a special 
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mission in the performance of the operation of the 
service station. 
POINT II 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 35-1-43, 
U.C.A. AS AMENDED DO NOT BRING DE-
CEASED WITHIN THE COURSE OF HIS EM-
PLOYMENT. 
This section above mentioned provides in part 
as follows: 
The words employee ... as used in this 
title, shall be construed to mean: 
( 4) If the employer is a partnership, or 
sole proprietorship, such employer may elect 
to include as an "employee" within the pro-
visions of this act, any member of such part-
nership, or the owner of the sole proprietor-
ship, devoting full time to the partnership 
or proprietorship business. 
It appears that Plaintiffs' counsel believes that 
this section, particularly the words devoting full 
time means something different than what is usually 
meant by such term and that by reason thereof the 
deceased was covered from the time he left his home. 
The ordinary understanding of the words devoting 
full-time means to include those who are working 
at a normal full-time occupation rather than one 
working on a part-time basis. Certainly it cannot 
be construed to mean that this statute was intended 
by the Legislature to mean that because an indi-
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vidual etuployer elects to come under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act that he is covered all the time. 
Can it reasonably be argued that he is covered for 
a greater period of time or under circumstances 
other than for which his employees are covered? This 
would be stretching the words of the statute far 
beyond their natural and usual meaning. It would 
be an extension of the coverage contemplated by the 
Workmen's Compensation Act as it had been inter-
preted by this Court. 
It is the Defendants' contention that the above 
mentioned statute as amended does not extend to an 
employer or sole proprietor or a partner any bene-
fits over and beyond those benefits which have over 
the years been afforded to employees covered under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act of this state. 
It is asked in Plaintiffs' Brief (P.B.5) : 
Would not a Judge be covered while driv-
ing to the Court house? Or would not the 
Commissioner be covered while traveling to 
an Industrial Commission hearing in some 
distant city? 
These propositions are not the same. Certainly 
a judge would not be covered if he met with an 
accident while on his way to where he regularly held 
court, but if he was injured while traveling to some 
other place to hold court he would be covered. The 
same is true of the Commissioner he would not be 
covered while journeying to the State Capitol Build-
ing where he regularly holds hearings, but he would 
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be covered while he traveled to some other part of 
the state to engage in the business of the Industrial 
Commission. 
The concept presented by Plaintiffs' Brief 
would make the coverage afforded to an individual 
proprietor the same as that afforded under an acci-
dent policy. We have no quarrel with the proposition 
that an individual employer may come and go as 
he pleases and that he will be covered when he is 
at his place of employment, or on a special mission, 
but we do contend that he is not covered while he 
is traveling to and from his home, with no special 
mission intervening. 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION WAS NOT ARB 1-
TRARY. 
Plaintiffs, in their brief, state that the Com-
mission disallowed the introduction in evidence of 
the briefcase together with the records contained 
therein, and that this action was arbitrary, and 
harmful to Plain tiffs. We cannot see how the Plain-
tiffs were in any way damaged or prejudiced in pre-
senting their case inasmuch as the record (R-17) 
contains the testimony of the witness, Mrs. JoAnn 
L. Bailey, that the deceased had his briefcase in the 
automobile at the time of the accident, and that the 
briefcase contained certain records which pertained 
to the station (R-18). No useful purpose would have 
been served to have had the briefcase itself in evi-
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dence. The Commission was fully informed as to 
the presence of the briefcase and papers. 
Plaintiffs object also to the ruling of the referee 
that the witness could not testify as to the habits of 
the deceased on previous occasions ( R-27) . Defend-
ants' counsel took the position that what was before 
the Commission was what occurred on the morning 
of the fatal accident. The evidence was clear that 
deceased was on the direct route from his home to 
his station at the time his motor vehicle collided with 
the concrete pillar on the overhead bridge on Inter-
state 15, then under construction (R 45, 46). There 
was no reason to speculate that deceased was doing 
other than driving from his home to his work. 
We believe that the Plaintiffs were not in any 
way precluded from presenting their case. 
The Industrial Commission's Order (R-56) 
finds as follows : 
No evidence was presented by Applicants 
to prove that deceased was in the course of 
his employment as a self-insured owner and 
operator of his business. In fact, the evidence 
is undisputed and conclusive in our opinion 
that the deceased was going to work when he 
was fatally injured and not on a special mis-
sion. 
The Industrial Commission has the duty to 
make findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
will not be disturbed unless the Commission arbi-
tt·arily and capriciously disregards the evidence. 
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In the case of Park Utah Consolidated Mines 
Company vs. The Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 
481, 36 P. 2d. 979, the Court said in part at 36 P. 2d. 
982: 
***in the determining of facts the con-
clusions of the Commission are like a verdict 
of a jury, and will not be interfered with by 
this Court when supported by some substan-
tial evidence. 
In a recent case, Burton vs. Industrial Commis-
sion, 13, Utah 2d. 553, 37 4, P. 2d. 439, this Court 
said at 374 P. 2d. 439: 
In order to reverse the finding and order 
made, the Plaintiff must show that there is 
such credible uncontradicted evidence in her 
favor that the Commission's refusal to so find 
was capricious and arbitrary. 
We submit that in view of the evidence sub-
mitted, and under the provisions of Section 35-1-85 
U.C.A., 1953 and the cases above cited that the In-
dustrial Commission's Findings of Fact are con-
clusive and final and should not be interfered with 
by the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the Industrial Commission 
properly conducted its proceedings in the matter, 
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and from the evidence reached the correct conclu-
sion. The decision and Order of the Commission 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
CHARLES WELCH, JR. 
922 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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